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REBUILDING CABO DELGADO: ETHICS, PEACE, AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS PILLARS OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

CABO DELGADO'NUN YENİDEN İNŞASI: TOPLUMSAL DÖNÜŞÜMÜN TEMEL DAYANAKLARI OLARAK ETİK, BARIŞ VE SÜRDÜRÜLEBİLİR EKONOMİK KALKINMA

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Abstract

Since 2017, the province of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique has been experiencing one of the most complex crises in the Southern African region, characterized by armed violence, mass population displacement, and the erosion of social, economic, and institutional structures. Based on a review of different scientific, empirical sources including the government, multilateral, and civil society documents, this article analyzes the challenges and opportunities for the province's reconstruction in light of three interdependent thematic axes: ethics and education for human capital development; peace and security for social reconciliation and community development; and public administration for sustainable economic development. It discusses how programs such as the Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan, the Northern Integrated Development and Resilience Program (PREDIN), and the operations of the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) coordinate the humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and development. The results suggest that sustainable reconstruction requires an integrated approach combining investment in human capital, the consolidation of positive peace, and economic diversification anchored in local communities empowerment, while avoiding excessive reliance on the extractive industry. The article concludes with practical recommendations for policymakers, cooperation partners, and community stakeholders aimed at achieving lasting social transformation in Cabo Delgado.

Keywords: Cabo Delgado; post-conflict reconstruction; sustainable development; human capital; peace and reconciliation

Öz

Mozambik'in kuzeyindeki Cabo Delgado eyaleti, 2017'den bu yana silahlı şiddet, kitlesel nüfus hareketliliği ve sosyal, ekonomik ve kurumsal yapıların aşınmasıyla karakterize edilen, Güney Afrika bölgesindeki en karmaşık krizlerden birini yaşamaktadır. Hükümet, çok taraflı kuruluşlar ve sivil toplum belgeleri dahil olmak üzere çeşitli bilimsel ve ampirik kaynakların incelenmesine dayanan bu makale, eyaletin yeniden inşasına yönelik zorlukları ve fırsatları, birbirine bağlı üç tematik eksen ışığında analiz etmektedir: beşeri sermaye gelişimi için etik ve eğitim; toplumsal uzlaş ve toplum kalkınması için barış ve güvenlik; ve sürdürülebilir ekonomik kalkınma için kamu yönetimi. Çalışma; Cabo Delgado Yeniden İnşa Planı, Kuzey Entegre Kalkınma ve Dayanıklılık Programı (PREDIN) ve Kuzey Entegre Kalkınma Ajansı (ADIN) faaliyetleri gibi programların insani yardım, istikrar sağlama ve kalkınma süreçlerini nasıl koordine ettiğini ele almaktadır. Elde edilen bulgular, sürdürülebilir bir yeniden inşanın; çıkarım endüstrisine aşırı bağımlılıktan kaçınırken, beşeri sermayeye yatırım, olumlu barışın pekiştirilmesi ve yerel toplulukların güçlendirilmesine dayalı ekonomik çeşitlendirmeyi birleştiren bütüncül bir yaklaşım gerektirdiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Makale, Cabo Delgado'da kalıcı bir toplumsal dönüşüm sağlamayı amaçlayan politika yapıcılar, iş birliği ortakları ve toplumsal paydaşlara yönelik pratik önerilerle sona ermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Cabo Delgado; çatışma sonrası yeniden inşa; sürdürülebilir kalkınma; beşeri sermaye; barış ve uzlaş

Rebuilding Cabo Delgado: Ethics, Peace, and Sustainable Economic Development as Pillars of Social Transformation

Introduction

Since October 2017, Cabo Delgado—a province in the far north of Mozambique bordering Tanzania—has been the scene of an armed conflict involving violent extremist groups linked to the self-styled Islamic State. These groups are commonly referred to in academic literature and the Mozambican press as "Al-Shabab," despite having no organizational connection to the Somali group of the same name (Bonate, 2024, Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2026; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project [ACLED], 2026). The conflict, which began as a localized insurgency in the Mocimboa da Praia district, progressively spread to other districts—including Palma, Macomia, Muidumbe, Quissanga, Chiúre, and Ancuabe—resulting in thousands of deaths, the destruction of social and productive infrastructure, and the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of people (Bagozzi, Benson & Koren, 2023; HRW, 2026; ACLED, 2026).

Nearly nine years into the crisis, the region continues to face persistent instability. According to recent humanitarian data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] (2026), more than 345,000 people remained displaced across Cabo Delgado and parts of the neighboring provinces of Nampula and Niassa as of the end of 2025; humanitarian assistance needs were estimated at over \$1.1 billion for the response in Cabo Delgado alone (OCHA, 2026). Districts such as Chiúre, Ancuabe, and Muidumbe saw new waves of displacement as recently as 2025 (Agostinho do Amaral, 2024; HRW, 2026; Cinquenta, Buanamade, Abdulkarim & Ramos, 2022), indicating that the crisis—far from being resolved—remains dynamic and recurrent, requiring responses that go beyond mere military containment (ACLED, 2026). Alongside its humanitarian and security dimensions, Cabo Delgado is also a province with enormous economic potential, linked to natural gas reserves in the Rovuma Basin, ruby and graphite mining projects in Montepuez and Balama, and a vast agricultural and coastal territory that remains underutilized (Feijó, 2026; Integrated Northern Development Agency [ADIN], 2021). This coexistence of potential wealth and structural poverty—and of large-scale foreign investment and the precariousness of local communities—constitutes one of the central paradoxes that this article seeks to examine (Centre for Public Integrity [CIP], 2026; Armand & Vicente, 2020).

The relevance of this article to the public audience stems precisely from the need to move beyond fragmented interpretations of the reconstruction process. Public discourse on Cabo Delgado often stands between an almost exclusive focus on security—centered on military operations against armed groups—and an almost exclusive focus on the economy—centered on major natural gas projects and their future revenues (Silva & Rafael, 2015). Taken in isolation, both perspectives risk overlooking the human dimension of the conflict—such as the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, children deprived of schooling, and families who have lost their livelihoods—and underestimating the role that education, health, community reconciliation, and local entrepreneurship can play in consolidating lasting peace. Furthermore, the reconstruction of territories affected by armed conflict has been the subject of extensive theoretical reflection over the past three decades, particularly within studies on peace-building, human development, and the political economy of natural resources. This framework is organized around the study's three thematic axes, highlighting their conceptual interconnections as an integrated approach regarding the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado through the: (i) ethics and citizenship and education for human capital empowerment; (ii) peace, security and social reconciliation for community development; and (iii) public administration (finance, management, entrepreneurship) for a sustainable economic development. The approach starts from the premise that no single axis is sufficient on its own to ensure lasting reconstruction and that the province's social transformation depends on their systemic integration.

Citizenship and Education in Human Capitalization for Social Well-being

The approach to development as the expansion of human capabilities—popularized by Sen's (1999) work on development and freedom—offers a fundamental conceptual framework for considering the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado. From this perspective, development is not reduced to economic growth but entails the expansion of people's substantive freedoms, including access to education, healthcare, civic participation, and dignified living conditions (Sen, 1999). In post-conflict contexts, human capital theory emphasizes that investment in education and health is a precondition for—rather than merely a consequence of—sustainable economic growth, given that better-educated and healthier populations demonstrate higher productivity, greater capacity for innovation, and increased resilience in the face of shocks.

The dimensions of ethics and citizenship add to this framework a concern for social justice, transparency in the management of public resources, and the construction of a renewed social contract between the State and the communities of Cabo Delgado—communities historically marked by feelings of marginalization vis-à-vis the central government. Literature on inclusive governance (North, 1990) suggests that the legitimacy of local institutions depends on their ability to meet the population's basic needs and ensure mechanisms for participation and accountability; otherwise, the institutional vacuum risks being filled by extremist narratives or by alternative—and sometimes violent—forms of community authority (North, 1990; Feijó, 2023; CIP, 2026).

Regarding health and well-being, literature on health in complex emergency contexts highlights that the collapse of public health services, coupled with mass displacement, exacerbates vulnerability to epidemic outbreaks—such as cholera (World Health Organization [WHO/AFRO], 2021)—and compromises key maternal and child health indicators (OCHA, 2026). Consequently, rebuilding human capital in Cabo Delgado entails not only the physical rehabilitation of schools and health facilities but also the restoration of community trust in these institutions, which were frequently targeted by direct attacks during the conflict (HRW, 2026; Manafe et al., 2024).

Security for Reconciliation toward Social Community Development

The classic distinction proposed by Galtung (1969)—between negative peace (understood as the mere absence of direct violence) and positive peace (understood as the existence of just social structures and cooperative relationships)—is particularly relevant for understanding the limitations of an exclusively military approach to the Cabo Delgado conflict. Security operations, while necessary to contain armed groups, cannot replace processes of social reconciliation, the reintegration of ex-combatants, and the rebuilding of the community fabric (Galtung, 1969; Lederach, 1997; Bradley & Svcevic, 2024).

Literature on community-based peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997) argues that the sustainability of peace depends on the involvement of local, traditional, and religious leaders in conflict mediation and in rebuilding trust among groups that were, at times, instrumentalized against one another during the crisis (Chambe, 2024, 2025). In Cabo Delgado, this dimension is particularly significant given the emergence of community self-defense militias; while their actions may contribute to containing threats in the short term, they pose challenges regarding demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration once the security risk subsides. (ACLED, 2026)

Community development, in turn, is understood in the literature (Lederach, 1997) as a process of strengthening communities' collective capacities to identify problems, mobilize resources, and participate in decision-making processes affecting their territory. In contexts of displacement and return—such as those experienced in several districts of Cabo Delgado (OCHA, 2026)—this process takes on an additional dimension: the rebuilding of a sense of belonging and collective identity, which is essential for preventing new cycles of violence (Lederach, 1997).

Public administration ensuring Sustainable Economic Development

Literature on the political economy of natural resources warns of the risk of the so-called "resource curse" (Auty, 1993), whereby countries or regions rich in extractive resources may experience lower-than-expected development performance due to phenomena such as rent dependency, poor productive diversification, and institutional capture (Mosca, 2021; Timbe et al., 2024). This risk is particularly relevant for Cabo Delgado, an economy heavily shaped by the expectation of revenues from natural gas and mining, yet where direct benefits to local communities remain limited (ADIN, 2021).

Conversely, literature on local economic development (Auty, 1993) argues that diversifying the productive base, strengthening agricultural and fisheries value chains, and supporting micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises offer more inclusive pathways for job creation and poverty reduction than exclusive reliance on large extractive projects, which tend to have limited local multiplier effects. From this perspective, promoting entrepreneurship—especially among displaced youth and women—emerges as a tool for both economic growth and social cohesion (World Bank, 2025), as it restores a sense of agency and active participation in community reconstruction to those affected by the conflict.

Regarding public management, literature on good governance (North, 1990) in reconstruction contexts highlights the importance of coordination mechanisms among multiple actors—the central state, local governments, development agencies, international partners, and the private sector—as well as robust systems for planning, budget execution, and results monitoring. Without these elements, resources allocated for reconstruction tend to be underutilized or diverted from their original objectives (North, 1990; CIP, 2026; Thabet, 2026).

The article follows a structure adapted for the applied social sciences: following this introduction, the theoretical framework—organized around the three thematic axes—is presented; this is followed by a description of the methodology; the results of the document analysis; a discussion of the findings in light of existing literature; and, finally, conclusions and recommendations addressed to the various stakeholders involved in the reconstruction process.

Method

Research Method

The study adopts a qualitative approach - exploratory and descriptive-analytical in nature - based on a documentary review of secondary sources. This methodological choice is justified by the nature of the subject matter—an ongoing, multidimensional reconstruction process that is not yet well-consolidated in terms of systematized primary data - and by the need to cross-reference information from various types of actors (Creswell, 2014)

Research Data Source

Three types of documentary sources, selected between 2022 and 2026, were analyzed: (i) reports from international organizations and United Nations agencies regarding the humanitarian and human rights situation in Cabo Delgado, specifically from the OCHA (2026) and HRW (2026); (ii) documents from the government and Mozambican public agencies responsible for the region's reconstruction, notably the Integrated Development Agency of the North (ADIN) and official communications related to the Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan (Diário Económico, 2025) and the ADIN (2021); and (iii) news and analyses from Mozambican media outlets and conflict monitoring organizations (AIM, 2026; Rádio Moçambique, 2026; VOA, 2022; ACLED, 2026; CIP, 2026), and empirical studies used as a complementary source of recent factual data to emphasize the situation (Scott, 1990; Bowen, 2018)

Data analysis

The analysis followed a thematic categorization procedure, organizing the collected information according to the three axes structuring this article (Braun & Clarke, 2006). For each axis, the aim was to identify: (a) the current situation; (b) keys of the ongoing initiatives; (c) obstacles identified in the literature and consulted sources; and (d) interconnections with the other thematic axes. This procedure enabled an integrated understanding of the reconstruction process, avoiding a compartmentalized analysis that might - for instance - decouple security from the economic dimension or education from the peace dimension (Bardin, 1977; Yin, 2018).

Study limitations include the dynamic and sometimes contradictory nature of information regarding a region with restricted humanitarian access; reliance on secondary sources without the possibility of direct field verification; and the rapidly evolving security situation, which can render some of the presented data outdated within a short timeframe. Nevertheless, the triangulation of diverse sources is considered to lend sufficient robustness to the conclusions presented (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Denzin, 1978; Patton, 2002).

Findings

Human Capital and Social Well-being Component

Documentary analysis reveals that the crisis in Cabo Delgado continues to have severe impacts on the province's human capital. According to 2025 data (HRW, 2026), more than 95,000 people have fled insecure conditions in the region since January of that year - particularly in the Chiúre, Ancuabe, and Muidumbe districts—and a significant proportion of the displaced are children, which directly compromises access to education and basic health services (Manafe et al., 2024). Reports also indicate that armed groups have resorted to child abductions, further exacerbating the vulnerability of the younger population and eroding the social fabric of affected communities (HRW, 2026; Ayad & Amarasingam, 2025).

In response, human capital investment programs have been implemented in the Northern region, including Cabo Delgado, with support from multilateral partners (World Bank, 2025). One such program aims to improve inclusive access to basic social services in vulnerable and conflict-prone districts, spanning the health, education, and social welfare sectors (Nhampoca & Maritz, 2024). Reported results include access to sexual and reproductive health services for hundreds of thousands of adolescents, training for community agents and health professionals on gender-based violence, and specific measures to keep girls in school - such as the distribution of bicycles and menstrual dignity kits - designed to reduce dropout rates linked to transportation and hygiene barriers (World Bank, 2025; Kan & Pontuschka, 2023; Feijó, 2021).

Despite these advances, the sources consulted indicate that the implementation of these programs is falling short of initial projections due to execution constraints, limited humanitarian access in active conflict zones, and a lack of sustainable funding for social sectors - including education - a situation exacerbated by the 2025 suspension of significant external aid from one of Mozambique's key international cooperation partners (HRW, 2026; AIM, 2025; Martinez-Alvarez et al., 2025). The ethical dimension of reconstruction is also highlighted by reports of political violence linked to the 2024 electoral cycle, including the assassination of opposition party officials; this reveals persistent, broader weaknesses in the social contract and in trust in institutions, extending beyond the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado itself (OCHA, 2026; Macagno, 2025).

The Security Component of Socio-Community Development

Regarding security, the data analyzed show that the conflict in Cabo Delgado intensified significantly during July, August, and September 2025. This had a direct impact on the movement of humanitarian workers, led to the temporary suspension of aid organization activities, and resulted in increased demands for ransom and extortion by

armed groups. This situation confirms the persistence of instability—a crisis that, nine years after its onset, has yet to be definitively resolved through military means (ACLED, 2026; HRW, 2025; Bradley & Svicevic, 2024).

Simultaneously, community self-defense dynamics have emerged in areas of northern Mozambique—most notably involving the Naparama group. Their activities in the Nampula and Zambézia provinces prompted the Mozambican armed forces to conduct a special two-week operation in 2025, which significantly reduced political violence associated with the group in those provinces (ACLED, 2026; Chambe, 2024, 2025). However, document analysis highlights that the group was neither demobilized nor disarmed for nearly a year following the operation; it remained a latent threat, illustrating the limitations of purely security-focused responses when unaccompanied by formal processes of dialogue, demobilization, and reintegration (ACLED, 2026; Lederach, 1997; Wiegink, 2024). Regarding community development and social reconciliation, the Integrated Development Agency of the North (ADIN) has sought to explicitly link three sequential objectives in its intervention in Cabo Delgado - humanitarian assistance, peace-building and stabilization, and development- recognizing that these three dimensions cannot be addressed in isolation (Alberdi Bidaguren, 2025; AIM, 2026; ADIN, 2021). Within this framework, specific projects focused on social cohesion and community resilience have been identified, aimed at promoting employment in conflict-affected communities, alongside initiatives for the physical reconstruction of infrastructure- including support for districts struck by extreme weather events, such as cyclones, which compound the security crisis and exacerbate population vulnerability (AIM, 2026; Ndlovu et al., 2024; Orre & Forquilha, 2023).

Public Management as a Foundation for Sustainable Economic Development

From a public management perspective (both financial and resource view), the results of the analysis reveal a significant effort to mobilize resources for the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado (Gaventa, 2021; Feijó, 2023). Local government sources valued the province's Reconstruction Plan at approximately three hundred million US dollars, while the broader Northern Integrated Development and Resilience Program was budgeted at around two and a half billion dollars (Diário Económico, 2025). In the beginning of 2026, a total investment of approximately 2.3 billion dollars was announced to accelerate development in the Northern region; this is funded primarily by international partners-notably the World Bank (AIM, 2026)- and complemented by contributions from other multilateral institutions, including the African Development Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (ACLED, 2026).

However, official data indicate that by the end of 2025, the implementation rate of the Northern region's main development program stood at only around thirty percent. This reveals a significant gap between the volume of announced resources and their actual application on the ground. To address this challenge, a project management system for the North was established to improve coordination and the monitoring of budget execution. Additionally, a central office for reforms and strategic projects was created by presidential decree in 2025; possessing administrative autonomy and a direct link to the Presidency of the Republic, this office reflects the political priority assigned to accelerating these reforms (CIP, 2026; AIM, 2026).

Regarding entrepreneurship, a business recovery support program was identified which, according to official sources, enabled dozens of companies in Cabo Delgado to begin receiving initial funding (AIM, 2026) - distributed in installments contingent upon proof that the previous tranche of funds had been utilized. Concurrently, the government mapped out nine industrial parks in the province, designed as development hubs linked to the region's major extractive and energy projects, particularly the Rovuma Basin natural gas operations. These data confirm the strategic focus on diversifying the local production base discussed by Auty (1993), although a risk remains that the benefits of these industrial hubs may stay concentrated around large-scale extractive investments, without sufficiently impacting the household and community economies most affected by the conflict (Khasab, 2021; Els & Chelin, 2021).

A second element cutting across all three axes, identified through document analysis, is the gender dimension. Several of the analyzed programs include specific components targeting women and girls—ranging from the distribution of menstrual hygiene kits and bicycles to support school retention, to prioritizing displaced women in entrepreneurship support programs (World Bank, 2025). This focus reflects an acknowledgment found in post-conflict reconstruction literature (Lederach, 1997; Kaaria & Murithi, 2025): that women and children tend to bear a disproportionate share of the social costs of displacement while simultaneously serving as key actors in rebuilding the community fabric. Consequently, their explicit inclusion in reconstruction policies should not be viewed as a peripheral matter, but rather as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the interventions themselves (Jones & Sen, 2024, Frynas and Buur, 2020).

Discussion

The results presented confirm the central hypothesis of this article: that the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado cannot be achieved through isolated sectoral interventions but rather requires systemic coordination among the three thematic axes analyzed. The persistence of new displacement episodes in 2025—nearly a decade after the conflict began (HRW, 2026)—demonstrates that security stabilization alone has been insufficient to enable the safe and sustainable

return of populations to their areas of origin (Manafe et al., 2024), thereby corroborating the theoretical distinction between negative and positive peace discussed by Galtung (1969).

The interconnection between these axes is particularly evident in the relationship between security and human capital: the collapse of access to education and healthcare in conflict-affected districts is not merely a consequence of violence (Orre & Forquilha, 2023) but also—according to the peacebuilding literature (Lederach, 1997)—a factor that can fuel new cycles of instability. This occurs because young populations lacking educational or economic prospects become more vulnerable to extremist narratives or alternative, violent forms of social organization, as illustrated by the emergence of self-defense militias in neighboring areas (Chambe, 2024, 2025; ACLED, 2026).

An analysis of the public management and financial dimensions reveals a significant tension between the scale of resources announced for reconstruction - collectively exceeding several billion dollars (Diário Económico, 2025; AIM, 2026)—and their actual implementation, which remains limited (AIM, 2026). This discrepancy can be interpreted through the lens of institutionalist literature (North, 1990), which often links such delays to weaknesses in institutional capacity, coordination mechanisms among multiple partners that are still maturing, and the inherent complexity of operating in districts with restricted humanitarian access (OCHA, 2026). The establishment of centralized coordination bodies, such as the reform office linked to the Presidency (CIP, 2026), suggests political recognition of this fragility; however, their effectiveness depends on balanced coordination with existing sectoral institutions to avoid overlapping mandates or an excessive concentration of decision-making power (Alberdi Bidaguren, 2025; North, 1990).

Regarding the economic dimension, the data confirm the theoretical risk of the "resource curse" (Auty, 1993): investment in gas- and mining-related industrial parks (AIM, 2026), while significant for infrastructure development, risks perpetuating a growth model that lacks inclusivity unless accompanied by deliberate mechanisms to link with local value chains, build local workforce capacity, and transparently redistribute extractive revenues (Timbe et al., 2024; Auty, 1993). Support programs for micro and small enterprises identified in the document analysis (AIM, 2026) serve as a relevant counterweight to this trend, yet their scale—in terms of the number of businesses supported—remains far below the magnitude of the extractive investments announced for the region.

Finally, the ethical and citizenship dimension emerges as a cross-cutting theme that intersects the other two: the political violence recorded in the post-election period—linked to the assassinations of party officials (HRW, 2026)—demonstrates that the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado cannot be divorced from a broader debate on the quality of democratic governance in Mozambique (North, 1990). A reconstruction process that is technically well-designed but lacks political legitimacy and civic trust is unlikely to yield lasting social transformation (Macagno, 2025; Sen, 1999).

It is also worth noting that the coexistence of counter-insurgency military operations, reconstruction programs funded by international partners, and community self-defense initiatives creates a complex institutional environment in which different actors may, at times, pursue intervention strategies that are poorly coordinated with one another. Literature on coordination in complex emergency contexts (North, 1990) highlights that the absence of clear mechanisms for coordination among humanitarian, development, and security actors tends to lead to a duplication of efforts, gaps in geographic coverage (Bradley & Svicevic, 2024), and—in extreme cases—contradictions between interventions; for instance, when the pace of displaced persons' returns, driven by development programs, is not matched by effective security guarantees in their districts of origin (OCHA, 2026). The experience in Cabo Delgado suggests that establishing coordination structures—such as the Northern project management system and the central reform office (CIP, 2026)—is a significant step, yet its effectiveness will depend on the ability to ensure, in practice, an ongoing dialogue among the security, humanitarian, and economic development dimensions (Wiegink, 2024).

Conclusion

The study sought to demonstrate that the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado is a multidimensional process in which the pillars of ethics and human capital, peace and community cohesion, and the economy and public management are deeply interconnected. Nearly a decade after the conflict began, the province shows simultaneous signs of institutional progress—reflected in the mobilization of significant financial resources and the creation of new coordination structures—and persistent fragility, evident in recurring displacement, slow budget execution, and lingering broader political and social tensions.

Based on this analysis, the following recommendations are formulated, organized according to the three thematic pillars of the Scientific Conference. Regarding the pillar of ethics, citizenship, education, human capital, health, and well-being, it is recommended to: (i) prioritize sustainable and predictable funding for the education and health sectors in Cabo Delgado, reducing reliance on volatile external sources; (ii) strengthen specific protection mechanisms for displaced children and adolescents, including responses to abductions and gender-based violence; and (iii) invest in transparency and accountability mechanisms that bolster community trust in local public institutions.

Regarding the areas of peace, security, social reconciliation, and community development, it is recommended to: (i) complement security operations with formal, ongoing processes for dialogue, demobilization, and the reintegration of armed groups and community self-defense forces; (ii) strengthen the role of traditional and religious leaders in mediating local conflicts and rebuilding inter-community trust; and (iii) ensure that programs for the return of displaced persons are accompanied by effective investment in community infrastructure to prevent new cycles of displacement.

Regarding the areas of administration, finance, management, entrepreneurship, and sustainable economic development, it is recommended to: (i) accelerate budget execution for already funded reconstruction programs by strengthening the technical capacity of local project management institutions; (ii) significantly scale up support programs for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, with particular attention to displaced youth and women; and (iii) ensure that industrial parks linked to extractive projects incorporate binding mechanisms for local content, community employment, and transparent revenue redistribution, so as to avoid replicating a model of exclusionary growth.

Ultimately, the social transformation and sustainable development of Cabo Delgado depend on the ability of the stakeholders involved—the State, international partners, the private sector, and local communities—to treat reconstruction as an integrated process rather than a series of disconnected sectoral interventions. Only an approach combining genuine investment in human capital, the consolidation of a positive and lasting peace, and an inclusive, diversified economic model can transform Cabo Delgado's potential into a solid foundation for the future of its people.

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Giriş

2017'den bu yana Mozambik'in Cabo Delgado eyaleti, IŞİD bağlantılı ancak Somali Al-Shabab'ıyla örgütsel ilişkisi olmayan silahlı gruplar nedeniyle şiddetli bir çatışmanın sahnesi olmuştur. Mocimboa da Praia'da başlayan isyan, Palma, Macomia, Muidumbe gibi bölgelere yayılmış; binlerce ölüme, altyapı yıkımına ve yüz binlerce kişinin yerinden edilmesine yol açmıştır. Dokuz yıl sonra bile bölge istikrarsız kalmaya devam etmekte, 2025 sonunda 345.000'den fazla kişi yerinden edilmiş durumdayken insani yardım ihtiyacı 1,1 milyar doları aşmaktadır. Çatışma, sadece askeri bir sorun değil; doğal gaz, yakut ve grafit gibi büyük ekonomik potansiyele rağmen yapısal yoksullukla iç içe geçmiş bir paradoksu da yansıtmaktadır. Makale, güvenlik ve ekonomi eksenli tek taraflı yaklaşımların insani boyutu göz ardı ettiğini vurgulayarak, kalıcı yeniden yapılanmanın ancak üç eksenin sistemik entegrasyonu ile mümkün olduğunu savunmaktadır: (i) etik, vatandaşlık ve eğitim yoluyla insan sermayesi güçlendirmesi; (ii) barış, güvenlik ve toplumsal uzlaşma yoluyla toplum kalkınması; (iii) kamu yönetimi ve girişimcilik yoluyla sürdürülebilir ekonomik kalkınma. Bu eksenlerden hiçbirisi tek başına yeterli değildir.

Yöntem

Bu çalışma, nitel, keşifsel ve betimsel-analitik nitelikte olup, ikincil kaynakların doküman incelemesine dayanmaktadır. Bu tercih, konunun henüz sistemli birincil verilerle konsolide olmamış, çok boyutlu ve devam eden bir yeniden yapılanma süreci olmasından ve farklı aktör türlerinden gelen bilgilerin çapraz karşılaştırılması ihtiyacından kaynaklanmaktadır (Creswell, 2014). 2022-2026 yılları arasında seçilen üç tür doküman kaynağı analiz edilmiştir: (i) Cabo Delgado'daki insani ve insan hakları durumuna ilişkin uluslararası kuruluş ve BM raporları (OCHA, 2026; HRW, 2026); (ii) bölgenin yeniden inşasından sorumlu Mozambik hükümeti ve kamu kurumlarına ait belgeler (ADIN, Cabo Delgado Yeniden İnşa Planı, 2025; ADIN, 2021); ve (iii) Mozambik medyası ile çatışma izleme kuruluşlarının haber ve analizleri (AIM, Rádio Moçambique, VOA, ACLED, CIP), ayrıca güncel verileri desteklemek amacıyla ampirik çalışmalar (Scott, 1990; Bowen, 2018).

Analiz, makaleyi yapılandıran üç tematik eksene göre bilgilerin sınıflandırıldığı tematik kategorilendirme yöntemiyle yürütülmüştür (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Her eksen için mevcut durum, sürmekte olan girişimler, karşılaşılan engeller ve diğer eksenlerle bağlantılar belirlenmeye çalışılmış, böylece bütünsel bir anlayış sağlanmıştır (Bardin, 1977; Yin, 2018).

Sınırlılıklar arasında kısıtlı insani erişim, ikincil kaynaklara bağımlılık ve hızla değişen güvenlik durumu yer almakla birlikte, kaynak çeşitliliğinin sonuçlara yeterli güvenilirlik kazandırdığı değerlendirilmektedir (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Denzin, 1978; Patton, 2002).

Bulgular

İnsan Sermayesi ve Sosyal Refah: Cabo Delgado'daki kriz insan sermayesini ağır biçimde etkilemeye devam etmektedir; 2025 verilerine göre 95.000'den fazla kişi, özellikle Chiúre, Ancuabe ve Muidumbe bölgelerinden yerinden edilmiş, bunların önemli kısmını çocuklar oluşturmaktadır (HRW, 2026; Manafe et al., 2024). Silahlı grupların çocuk kaçırma eylemleri toplumsal dokuyu zedelemektedir. Çok taraflı ortaklarla yürütülen insani sermaye programları, üreme sağlığı hizmetleri, toplum ajanlarına eğitim ve kız çocuklarının okulda kalmasını sağlayan bisiklet/hijyen kiti dağıtımı gibi sonuçlar üretmiştir; ancak sınırlı insani erişim, sürdürülebilir finansman eksikliği ve 2025'te önemli bir dış yardımın kesilmesi uygulamayı zayıflatmaktadır (Nhampoca & Maritz, 2024; Macagno, 2025; Martinez-Alvarez et al., 2025; World Bank, 2025; HRW, 2026; Ayad & Amarasingam, 2025).

Güvenlik ve Toplumsal Kalkınma: 2025'in Temmuz-Eylül aylarında çatışma yoğunlaşmış, insani yardım hareketliliği kısıtlanmış, fidye talepleri artmıştır (Bradley & Svicevic, 2024, Chambe, 2024, 2025; ACLED, 2026). Naparama gibi toplum öz savunma grupları ortaya çıkmış; askeri operasyon şiddeti azalsa da grup silahsızlandırılmamış, diyalog ve yeniden entegrasyon eksikliğini göstermiştir. ADIN, insani yardım, barış inşası ve kalkınmayı birbirine bağlayan projeler yürütmekte, altyapı onarımı ve iklim afetlerine (siklonlar) yanıtı da kapsamaktadır (Alberdi Bidaguren, 2025; AIM, 2026; ADIN, 2021; Ndlovu et al., 2024; Orre & Forquilha, 2023).

Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma için Kamu Yönetimi: Kuzey bölgesi için yaklaşık 2,3 milyar dolarlık yatırım duyurulmuş, ancak 2025 sonunda uygulama oranı yalnızca %30 civarında kalmıştır. Koordinasyonu güçlendirmek için yeni bir proje yönetim sistemi ve Cumhurbaşkanlığına bağlı bir reform ofisi kurulmuştur. Girişimcilik destekleri ve dokuz sanayi parkı planlanmış, ancak faydaların büyük ölçekli çıkarımcı yatırımlarda yoğunlaşma riski bulunmaktadır (Kaaria & Murithi, 2025). Toplumsal cinsiyet boyutu tüm eksenleri kesmekte; kadın ve kızların programlara dahil edilmesi, toplumsal yeniden inşanın etkinliği için ön koşul olarak değerlendirilmektedir (World Bank, 2025; Jones & Sen, 2024, Frynas and Buur, 2020; Lederach, 1997).

Tartışma ve Sonuç

Cabo Delgado'nun yeniden inşasının, izole sektörel müdahalelerle değil, güvenlik, insani sermaye, kamu yönetimi/finans ve ekonomi ile etik/vatandaşlık eksenleri arasındaki sistemik koordinasyonla mümkün olduğu tartışılmaktadır. 2025'teki yeni yerinden edilme dalgaları, salt güvenlik istikrarının yeterli olmadığını, Galtung'un negatif-pozitif barış ayrımını doğrular biçimde göstermektedir. Eğitim ve sağlığa erişimin çökmesi, çatışmanın sonucu olmanın ötesinde, gençleri aşırılıkçı anlatılara ve öz-savunma milislerine yönelten yeni istikrarsızlık döngülerini besleyebilmektedir.

Yeniden inşa için açıklanan milyarlarca dolarlık kaynaklar ile sınırlı fiili uygulama arasındaki uçurum, zayıf kurumsal kapasite, olgunlaşmamış koordinasyon mekanizmaları ve kısıtlı insani erişimle açıklanmaktadır; Cumhurbaşkanlığına bağlı reform ofisi gibi merkezi yapılar bu kırılmanın siyasi düzeyde kabulünü yansıtır. Gaz ve madencilik yatırımları, yerel değer zincirleriyle bağlantı kurulmadıkça "kaynak laneti" riskini taşımaktadır. Seçim sonrası siyasi şiddet ise, teknik olarak iyi tasarlanmış ama meşruiyetten yoksun bir sürecin kalıcı toplumsal dönüşüm sağlayamayacağını göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak, çatışmanın başlangıcından yaklaşık on yıl sonra, bölge hem önemli mali kaynak seferberliği ve yeni koordinasyon yapılarıyla kurumsal ilerleme hem de tekrarlayan yerinden edilme, yavaş bütçe uygulaması ve süregelen siyasi-toplumsal gerilimlerle kırılmalık belirtileri sergilemektedir..

Öneriler

Cabo Delgado'nun yeniden inşasının, izole sektörel müdahalelerle değil, güvenlik, insani sermaye, kamu yönetimi/finans ve ekonomi ile etik/vatandaşlık eksenleri arasındaki sistemik koordinasyonla mümkün olduğu tartışılmaktadır. 2025'teki yeni yerinden edilme dalgaları, salt güvenlik istikrarının yeterli olmadığını, Galtung'un negatif-pozitif barış ayrımını doğrular biçimde göstermektedir. Eğitim ve sağlığa erişimin çökmesi, çatışmanın sonucu olmanın ötesinde, gençleri aşırılıkçı anlatılara ve öz-savunma milislerine yönelten yeni istikrarsızlık döngülerini besleyebilmektedir. Yeniden inşa için açıklanan milyarlarca dolarlık kaynaklar ile sınırlı fiili uygulama arasındaki uçurum, zayıf kurumsal kapasite, olgunlaşmamış koordinasyon mekanizmaları ve kısıtlı insani erişimle açıklanmaktadır; Cumhurbaşkanlığına bağlı reform ofisi gibi merkezi yapılar bu kırılmanın siyasi düzeyde kabulünü yansıtır. Gaz ve madencilik yatırımları, yerel değer zincirleriyle bağlantı kurulmadıkça "kaynak laneti" riskini taşımaktadır. Seçim sonrası siyasi şiddet ise, teknik olarak iyi tasarlanmış ama meşruiyetten yoksun bir sürecin kalıcı toplumsal dönüşüm sağlayamayacağını göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak, çatışmanın başlangıcından yaklaşık on yıl sonra, bölge hem önemli mali kaynak seferberliği ve yeni koordinasyon yapılarıyla kurumsal ilerleme hem de tekrarlayan yerinden edilme, yavaş bütçe uygulaması ve süregelen siyasi-toplumsal gerilimlerle kırılmalık belirtileri sergilemektedir.

Etik, vatandaşlık, eğitim, beşeri sermaye, sağlık ve refah konusunda: (i) Cabo Delgado'da eğitim ve sağlık sektörleri için, değişken dış kaynaklara bağımlılığı azaltacak şekilde sürdürülebilir ve öngörülebilir finansman sağlanmasına öncelik verilmesi; (ii) yerinden edilmiş çocuklar ve ergenler için, kaçırma vakalarına ve toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı şiddete yönelik müdahaleler dahil olmak üzere özel koruma mekanizmalarının güçlendirilmesi; ve (iii) yerel kamu kurumlarına duyulan toplum güvenini

artıracak şeffaflık ve hesap verebilirlik mekanizmalarına yatırım yapılması önerilmektedir.

Barış, güvenlik, toplumsal uzlaşma ve toplum kalkınması alanlarında: (i) güvenlik operasyonlarının, silahlı grupların ve toplum öz savunma güçlerinin diyalog, terhis ve yeniden entegrasyonuna yönelik resmi ve sürekli süreçlerle tamamlanması; (ii) geleneksel ve dini liderlerin yerel çatışmaların arabuluculuğunda ve topluluklar arası güvenin yeniden inşasındaki rolünün güçlendirilmesi; ve (iii) yerinden edilmiş kişilerin geri dönüş programlarının, yeni yerinden edilme döngülerini önlemek amacıyla toplum altyapısına yönelik etkili yatırımlarla desteklenmesinin sağlanması önerilmektedir.

Yönetim, finans, işletme, girişimcilik ve sürdürülebilir ekonomik kalkınma alanlarında: (i) yerel proje yönetimi kurumlarının teknik kapasitesinin güçlendirilmesi yoluyla, halihazırda finanse edilmiş yeniden yapılanma programları için bütçe uygulamasının hızlandırılması; (ii) özellikle yerinden edilmiş gençlere ve kadınlara özel önem verilerek, mikro, küçük ve orta ölçekli işletmelere yönelik destek programlarının önemli ölçüde genişletilmesi; ve (iii) dışlayıcı bir büyüme modelinin tekrarlanmasını önlemek amacıyla, çıkarımcı projelere bağlı sanayi parklarının yerel içerik, toplum istihdamı ve şeffaf gelir yeniden dağılımına yönelik bağlayıcı mekanizmalar içermesinin sağlanması önerilmektedir.

Nihayetinde, Cabo Delgado'nun toplumsal dönüşümü ve sürdürülebilir kalkınması, sürece dahil olan paydaşların —Devlet, uluslararası ortaklar, özel sektör ve yerel topluluklar— yeniden yapılanmayı birbirinden kopuk sektörel müdahaleler dizisi olarak değil, bütünsel bir süreç olarak ele alma becerisine bağlıdır. Yalnızca beşeri sermayeye gerçek anlamda yatırım yapmayı, kalıcı ve olumlu bir barışın pekiştirilmesini ve kapsayıcı, çeşitlendirilmiş bir ekonomik modeli bir araya getiren bir yaklaşım, Cabo Delgado'nun potansiyelini halkının geleceği için sağlam bir temele dönüştürebilir.