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The Demographic Reality of the Arab Youth Population and Its Implications for Migration Trends toward Europe, 2020-2024 *An Analytical Study Based on Recent International Migration Reports*

Dr. Fatma Noui, Department of Sociology, University center of Barika, Algeria
fatma.noui@cu-barika.dz

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Abstract:

The aim of this research paper is to study Arab youth migration flows toward European countries on the basis of recent international reports. Migration has been one of the fundamental issues that have significantly affected the Middle East and North Africa for decades, and many inhabitants of the region seek to leave their countries in search of a better life and new opportunities in foreign countries. The findings of the study indicate that a large proportion of citizens of the Arab region seek to leave their countries in search of better living conditions elsewhere. However, the level of the desire to migrate varies according to economic and social conditions and the migration opportunities actually available. Most of those wishing to migrate are young people and university-educated individuals, as the younger generation shows greater interest in seeking new opportunities and a life in other countries. Migration is not merely the movement of individuals; rather, it is a transformative force capable of reshaping societies, economies, and cultures. In the future, migration is expected to continue playing a pivotal role in shaping the Arab region. The study provides a comprehensive perspective aimed at harnessing the potential of migration for the benefit of all by adopting a comprehensive and forward-looking approach to migration and development. This can help build a future in which the movement of individuals becomes a source of strength and resilience in the Arab region.

Keywords: youth categories, population structure, demographic indicators, migration, population.

Introduction

The causes of migration are associated with multiple factors, including wars and conflicts, rising levels of corruption and authoritarianism, high unemployment and limited employment opportunities, in addition to rapid population growth. Young people stand out as the group most affected by this situation in Arab countries. This is a tangible result of the unsound policies followed by the governments of these countries, their limited ability to manage resources effectively, and their reliance on an approach based on repression and security rather than sustainable development. In addition, the international community, especially the major powers, plays a role that is largely negative and exploitative. This role is reflected in their intense competition to dominate natural resources and strengthen their strategic positions, which further complicates the situation and produces additional adverse consequences for local populations.

The Arab presence in Europe increased markedly from the second decade of the twentieth century, and this trend continued during the first decades of the current century. One of its main causes was the substantial shortage in European labor markets resulting from demographic decline. This decline was caused by the enormous human losses resulting from wars of domination, from the Napoleonic Wars between 1803 and 1815 to the Second World War, which left more than 60 million civilian and military deaths. As this demographic decline deepened over the years because of falling fertility rates, many European countries began to regard migration flows as an essential means of addressing the situation. Their aim was to fill labor shortages and meet the requirements of economic development and the labor market in order to maintain the pace of development. For historical, geographical, and demographic reasons, Arab countries constitute a major source of migration flows toward European countries.

The European Union's migration system focuses on attracting highly skilled migrants, combating irregular migration, and examining the views of prospective migrants and their decisions to migrate. Nevertheless, migrants and refugees continue to arrive in Europe in large numbers, and many complex factors drive them to move to the European Union. This is the

case for young people from Arab countries, especially those bordering the Mediterranean, which are examined in this study: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Young people in these countries continue to wish to migrate in search of a better life. On the basis of the preceding discussion, the following questions are raised:

- What demographic developments has the Arab region experienced in recent years, which have resulted in the emergence of a youth bulge, as shown by data from recent Arab and international reports?
- How have deteriorating social and economic conditions affected Arab youth and driven them to migrate toward the European continent?
- What Arab and European policies and mechanisms have been adopted to manage and control migration flows?

Study Objectives

- To monitor demographic trends in the Arab region, with a focus on age groups in the youth stage.
- To study the factors and reasons behind Arab youths' desire to move toward Europe at different stages.
- To analyze the available data on migration globally and in the Arab region.
- To identify the strategies of Arab and European countries for managing irregular migration.

Study Importance

The importance of this study lies in presenting the latest demographic developments concerning youth groups in the Arab region, especially their migration toward Europe, by highlighting the most recent statistics based on secondary data sources. The study of Arab youth migration to Europe is highly important at the present time. It is not merely a temporary demographic phenomenon; rather, it reflects the complex economic, political, and social reality in many Arab countries. Studying Arab youth migration is a pivotal step in diagnosing the challenges in order to develop national development policies capable of absorbing the capacities of young people.

Research Methodology

In this study, we employed the descriptive method by analyzing the most important demographic data on youth groups and linking them to the phenomenon of migration toward Europe. This method provides a systematic scientific interpretation of the phenomenon by describing its trends and developments over time, accurately diagnosing it, analyzing the relationships among its components, and reaching an in-depth understanding of its reality. For this purpose, we collected detailed and accurate data and information from reports issued by Arab and international organizations and bodies.

First: Data and Information Sources

1. World Migration Report 2022, issued by the International Organization for Migration

This report is the product of a multifaceted collaborative project involving numerous partners and contributors under the supervision and management of the editor of the World Migration Report. Work on this edition of the World Migration Report 2022 began in March 2020 and culminated in its launch by the Director General in December 2021 during the 112th Session of the IOM Council. All reasonable measures were taken to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in the report, including data verification. Nevertheless, we apologize for any unintentional errors (IOM, 2022).

2. World Migration Report 2024, issued by the International Organization for Migration

This volume is the outcome of a major collaborative project involving many partners and contributors under the supervision of its authors. The World Migration Report 2024 project began in May 2022. The findings, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations contained herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration or its Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the International Organization for Migration concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area, its authorities, or its boundaries.

Every effort was made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this report through data verification. Nevertheless, we regret any errors in the data. This report does not refer to data or events occurring after October 2023. It was produced without the use of artificial intelligence tools (IOM, 2024).

3. Demographic Trends in the Arab Region, 1950-2030

This report was issued in 2025 and contains data and information on current demographic trends. These trends pose major challenges to the Arab region, but at the same time they open the door to tremendous opportunities for initiating radical transformations. By adopting appropriate forward-looking strategic policies, these trends can become a driving force for sustainable growth and for strengthening resilience and prosperity. Effective investment in fields such as education and healthcare, together with the implementation of economic policies that support and encourage innovation and entrepreneurship, can pave the way for the region's 244 million children and young people to contribute effectively to strengthening the economy in the short and long terms (ESCWA & United Nations, 2025).

4. Situation Report On International Migration in the Arab Region 2025


This report was issued in 2025 through a partnership between the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and the International Organization for Migration. It was prepared under the guidance of ESCWA Executive Secretary Rola Dashti and the insightful supervision of Mehrnaz El Awady, Director of the Population, Gender Justice and Inclusive Development Cluster, and Othman Belbeisi, IOM Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa. The report comes at a time when the region is undergoing major demographic, economic, social, and technological transformations. It provides a comprehensive analysis of current migration-related trends, challenges, and opportunities, as well as a deeper understanding of how development is shaped by migration and how migration is shaped by development (ESCWA & IOM, 2025).

Second: Demographic Transformations in the Arab Region

1. Population Structure

The population of the Arab region reached approximately 480 million in 2024, twice the number recorded in the early 1990s. This number is expected to double again over the next 35 years and reach one billion by 2060. At present, the population of the Arab region represents approximately 5.9% of the world's total population, estimated at 8.1 billion. The region's annual population growth rate is 1.9%. By 2030, the population of the Arab region is expected to exceed 540 million and account for 6.4% of the world's population.

Figure 1. Population Trends in the Arab Region (in millions), 1950–2030




Source: ESCWA, 2025, p 4

Today, men outnumber women throughout the Arab region. Men represent approximately 52% of the total population (ESCWA, 2025, p. 2), whereas women account for about 48%. This difference is particularly evident among the working-age population and is most likely attributable to the large number of migrant workers in the region, the majority of whom are men. Compared with the age structure of the world's population, the Arab region appears relatively young, as children aged 0-14 and young people aged 15-24 together constitute half of the total population.

The Arab region has undergone significant demographic changes over recent decades. Although children still represent a large proportion of the population today, the share of this age group declined markedly from 44.6% in 1980 to 32.5% by mid-2024. This decline reflects falling fertility rates and an increase in the proportion of older age groups. According to the data presented, the proportion of persons aged 65 years and above rose from 3.3% in 1980 to 4.6% at present and is expected to reach 5.4% by 2030. The working-age population also recorded sustained growth over past decades, rising from 52.1% in 1980 to 62.9% in 2024. This reflects clear changes in the population's age structure (ESCWA & United Nations, 2025, pp. 2-4).

Figure 2. Population pyramid for the Arab region, 2024



Source: ESCWA calculations using United Nations World Population Prospects (UNWPP) 2024 data.

2. Demographic Indicators

Maternal and infant health improved substantially over the past century, leading to a marked decline in infant mortality rates worldwide. The Arab region, in particular, recorded significant progress, with infant mortality declining by 88% since 1950. Nevertheless, the pace of this improvement appears to have slowed markedly over the past decade, both in the Arab region and globally. The infant mortality rate in Arab countries in 2024 is currently estimated at approximately 24 deaths per 1,000 live births (ESCWA & United Nations, 2025, p. 5).

The rates associated with these indicators vary across countries. If we consider the period 2015-2020, we note that the largest decline was recorded in Syria because of the war, at 0.20%, followed by Lebanon at 0.57% and Tunisia at 1.09%. Among migrant-sending countries with high rates are Somalia at 2.98%, Iraq at 2.82%, Palestine at 2.68%, and Sudan at 2.41%. In light of these data, the size of the Arab region's population will develop as shown in the following table:


Whether in terms of the pace of growth or the increase in absolute size, the Arab region is recording a clear rise in population. It represented 5.6% of the world's population in 2020, compared with no more than 3.3% in 1970. According to United Nations projections, this proportion is expected to reach 6.9% by 2050.

However, instead of being employed in the development of Arab countries, this population surge is pushing young people toward migration and asylum under the pressure of several factors. These include weak economic structures and the inability of these countries to create sufficient opportunities to employ available labor capacities. The lack of economic diversification, the absence of structural economic reforms, and the ineffectiveness of labor-market policies hinder progress in most countries. Meanwhile, the private sector lacks the qualifications that would enable it to lead the development process. Agriculture remains the main sector in many Arab countries. However, it lacks effective policies for revitalization and increased productivity, despite being one of the sectors capable of absorbing large numbers of workers.

3. Unemployment and Employment Rates

Unemployment rates are high in Arab countries. According to International Labour Office data, the rate reached 10.3% in 2016, the highest in the world and considerably above the global average of 5.9%. Unemployment is distributed unevenly by gender and age group. The overall unemployment rate among women reached 18.9% in 2017, compared with 7.6% among men. Youth unemployment in the region also recorded the highest rate in the same year, at 26.1%, more than twice the global average of 12.6%. Young women are again more vulnerable to unemployment. Their unemployment rate reached 39.3% in 2017, compared with 22.3% among young men. This explains the development of female migration, especially in some Arab countries. In addition, estimates in several countries indicate that 80% of young people work in the informal sector. They are concentrated in low-quality, low-productivity jobs in return for irregular and insecure income and do not benefit from social security. This reality is experienced by many Arab young people classified as the working poor, who consider migration a means of improving their economic conditions (Al-Khashani, 2020, pp. 34-35). The youth unemployment rate in the Arab region reached 27% in 2024, almost twice the global rate of 13%. This is approximately twice the unemployment rate in other regions, such as East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean, where unemployment rates are around 25%. Among young women, however, unemployment reached much higher levels, at 38%. This is attributable to several factors, including the absence of suitable employment opportunities and working conditions considered socially acceptable. The quality of employment is also a challenge throughout the region, further increasing the difficulties faced by young men and women in the labor market (ESCWA & IOM, 2025, p. 44).

Figure 3. Youth (aged 15–24) unemployment rates, 1991–2024




Source: ESCWA and IOM, 2025, p 44

Third: Demographic Data on Migration toward Europe and Other Countries of the World

When the geographical distribution of international migrants across United Nations regions in 2020 is analyzed, Europe ranks first as the largest destination for migrants. It receives 87 million international migrants, equivalent to 30.9% of the total. It is followed by Asia with 86 million migrants, or 30.5%. North America ranks third, hosting 59 million migrants,

or 20.9%, followed by Africa, where 25 million migrants reside, representing 9%. During the past fifteen years, Latin America and the Caribbean recorded a marked increase in the number of international migrants, from approximately 7 million to 15 million. This made it the fastest-growing region in terms of receiving migrants, accounting for 5.3% of all international migrants. Oceania hosts approximately 9 million international migrants, equivalent to 3.3% of the total. Figure 6 shows the development of the number of international migrants in each region between 2005 and 2020 (IOM, 2022, p. 9).

Figure 4. International migrants, by major region of residence, 2005–2020 (millions)



Source: IOM, 2022, p 9

The increase in international migration in some regions affected population change. Europe remained one of the main destination regions for international migrants, but it experienced the slowest rate of population change during this period, at slightly over 1%. However, this rate would have been much lower without international migrants, who mitigated population decline in some European countries caused by low birth rates. For example, a list was compiled of the largest countries and territories of origin of migrants. In 2019, Asia was the region of origin of more than 40% of all international migrants worldwide, amounting to approximately 112 million migrants. Most originated from India, the largest country of origin, as well as China and South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Mexico was the second-largest country of origin, while the Russian Federation ranked fourth. The list also includes several European countries, including Ukraine, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Germany (IOM, 2020, pp. 24-26).

Fourth: Dynamics of Youth Migration in the Arab Region

1. Causes and Drivers of Youth Migration

The Arab Barometer Migration Report, issued in 2024, showed that economic motives ranked first among the reasons cited by those wishing to migrate in most surveyed countries. This applied to Jordan, at 90%, and Tunisia, at 89%, where overwhelming majorities cited economic reasons. The same was true in Lebanon and Mauritania, where approximately seven out of every ten people cited the same economic motive, at 72% and 69%, respectively. In Palestine, more than half of those considering migration, approximately 57%, stated that economic factors drove their desire to migrate. Kuwait was the only country in which fewer than half of those wishing to migrate cited economic motives, at 29%.

Unlike economic reasons, which were cited by majorities and large numbers in the surveyed countries, the other factors driving people's desire to migrate are generally limited to local challenges facing each country. In Lebanon, approximately one quarter of prospective migrants stated that they wished to migrate for political reasons, at 23%, or because of corruption, at 24%. As expected, the economic and political crises in Lebanon place considerable pressure on segments of the population, prompting them to consider seeking a better life abroad.

More than half of those wishing to migrate, approximately 56%, stated that the reason was the search for better educational opportunities abroad. In no other country included in the survey did more than approximately one fifth cite the same motive. In Mauritania and Lebanon, 21% said that they wished to leave their countries in pursuit of education, compared with 17% in Palestine, 8% in Jordan, and 6% in Tunisia, where education was regarded as a principal motive behind the desire to migrate (Abu Falgha, 2024, pp. 7-8).

2. Migration Data in Arab Countries

Data on the number of migrants vary according to the statistics published by the country of origin or the host country and according to the criteria used to define a migrant, namely nationality or place of birth. Some countries apply what is known as *jus sanguinis*, or the 'right of blood,' which does not permit the naturalization of foreigners. Other countries apply *jus soli*, or the 'right of the soil,' which permits naturalization under conditions relating to residence or birth in the host country. For example, Germany applied *jus sanguinis* strictly until 1999. Of the two million Turkish nationals residing in Germany in 2005, only 49,000 held dual nationality (Fargues, 2005, p. 12). Migrants to the European Union

from Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and North African countries represent approximately 65% of the total number of migrants from these countries worldwide. However, this proportion varies considerably from one country to another (Thibaut, 2010, p. 5).

If we consider the principal Arab migrant-sending countries, a difference emerges between the Maghreb and Mashreq countries. With regard to the Mashreq, the number of migrants reached 17,526,517 in 2017, representing 75.8% of total Arab migration. They were concentrated mainly in the Arab region, at 64%, whereas Europe accounted for no more than 7.5% of this distribution. However, the desire to migrate to Europe has been increasing steadily. The old continent has become the preferred destination for some Mashreq countries amid the crises sweeping the region and the restrictive policies imposed by the Gulf States on migration from Arab countries. The remaining migrants from the Mashreq were distributed between non-Arab Asian countries, at 20%, the Americas, at 6%, and small proportions in Oceania and non-Arab African countries. With regard to the Maghreb, the number of migrants exceeded 5.6 million in 2017, accounting for approximately 24% of all migrants and refugees from the Arab region. Morocco ranked first among the countries of origin (Al-Khashani, 2020, pp. 37-38).

Given the geographical location of the Arab region at the crossroads of east and west and north and south, movement between the world's regions has historically been a prominent feature. In 2024, Europe remained the principal destination for migrants and refugees from the Arab region who moved outside the region. They accounted for more than 37%, or 13.8 million migrants. Sub-Saharan Africa was the second most common destination, maintaining a stable share of approximately 8% of migrants and refugees from the Arab region. North America was the third most common destination, accounting for % of migration from the Arab region. Movement toward other regions remained limited (ESCWA & IOM, 2025, p. 11).

Table 1. Numbers of migrants and refugees from the Arab countries to various regions of the world, 1990-2024

From the Arab region to:	1990	2000	2010	2020	2024
Sub-Saharan Africa	728,532	891,761	1,156,546	2,120,676	3,125,272
Central and South Asia	322,766	256,602	182,089	134,105	145,005
East and South-East Asia	7,643	12,337	16,987	37,033	36,718
Latin America and the Caribbean	70,461	63,765	58,834	71,169	75,037
Oceania	137,375	184,440	273,417	374,275	398,043
Europe	3,727,963	4,475,238	6,148,487	13,062,493	13,824,935
North America	335,051	564,566	857,936	1,289,809	1,494,029
Arab region	4,814,439	6,606,089	12,280,909	16,717,312	18,145,852
World	10,144,553	13,055,193	20,975,744	33,807,518	37,245,561

Source: ESCWA and IOM, 2025, p 11

A minority attempt to cross European Union borders clandestinely. The number of irregular African migrants has also increased slowly in recent years. Nationals of Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria constitute the six largest African sources of intercepted border crossings in recent years. Together, these countries account for more than half of all intercepted border crossings involving Africans.

North African countries attempted to deter crossings of the Mediterranean and, at the request of the European Union, moved migrants away from coastal cities. These measures were sometimes severe. Tunisian authorities deported hundreds of migrants and left them in the desert on the Libyan border. In Libya, migrants' homes and workplaces were raided, and thousands were forcibly deported to Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia without legal review (Williams, 2024).

Fifth: European Policies for Migration Management

European Union policy toward the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean is governed primarily by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched at the 1995 Barcelona Conference. The objective of the Barcelona Process is to create a common area of peace and stability and a free-trade area, and to promote understanding and exchange among cultures and civil society through bilateral and multilateral agreements. The process covers three areas: dialogue on security and stability and the promotion of democracy and human rights; financial and economic cooperation; and dialogue on social and cultural issues. Migration intersects with all three areas.

The European Union defined the elements of its common migration policy at the 1999 Tampere European Council. The adoption of this policy was confirmed through the Hague Programme in 2004. The Treaty of Lisbon reaffirmed the European Union's commitment to developing a common migration policy and extended qualified-majority voting procedures to asylum and migration issues. Nevertheless, European Union Member States retain the right to determine the volume of admission of third-country nationals seeking employment (Thibaut, 2010, pp. 9-10).

The European Commission published its New Pact in September 2020. It aims to integrate asylum procedures into comprehensive migration management and link them to pre-entry screening and return. It also covers external border management, crisis preparedness and response accompanied by a solidarity mechanism, and external relations with key countries of origin and transit. The New Pact includes a Commission recommendation to establish complementary legal

pathways to protection, such as resettlement and other forms of humanitarian admission, including community sponsorship schemes, as well as pathways to protection related to education and employment. On 15 November 2023, the Commission proposed a Skills and Talent Mobility package that included a proposal to establish an EU Talent Pool, along with measures to simplify procedures for recognizing qualifications in order to promote student mobility and labor-market mobility (European Parliament, 2024, pp. 2-4).

Sixth: Results and discussion

- Labor-market conditions facing young people throughout the region will become more difficult as the youth population continues to grow, especially in the least developed countries. All economies are struggling to create sufficient decent and productive jobs to absorb incoming cohorts of young people. Increasing competition for scarce opportunities will intensify the pressures that drive migration.

- Increasing xenophobia makes life more difficult for migrants to Europe. However, population ageing across the continent means that the proportion of people of working age is declining, which means that demand for foreign labor will continue. Strengthening migrant workers' skills and matching them more effectively with available jobs are factors that help them earn more and contribute more to host societies. European governments recognize this and support mobility, migration, and skills partnership programs, such as the International Labour Organization's THAMM Plus program. The program aims to enhance the employability of prospective migrant workers and develop regular and sustainable labor-mobility pathways that lead to decent employment opportunities between Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and European Union Member States.

- The impact of migration on development outcomes in countries of origin and destination is complex and often the subject of research and debate. Its consequences depend on economic conditions and labor-market dynamics. Migrant workers also contribute to the economic development of their countries in several important ways. Most acquire skills, work experience, and access to networks in destination countries, which may help improve their careers and earning prospects in their home countries if and when they decide to return. Exposure to such opportunities may yield substantial future benefits in the form of transferring skills and knowledge to countries of origin, even when migrants return only temporarily. High levels of skills and experience may also increase remittances if migrant workers remain in destination countries. However, many observers point to the potential negative effects of migration on countries of origin, including the loss of skills and knowledge that could otherwise have contributed to national development.

- The adverse effect of outward brain drain has long been the subject of debate. This loss occurs in countries where migrant workers could have been employed productively. Migration does not occur because of a lack of opportunities, but because decent work and better living conditions are available in destination countries or because of non-economic factors. All labor-abundant Arab countries and countries affected by conflict experience weak economic conditions. In such economies, the benefits of migration appear in the form of remittances, the transfer of knowledge upon return to countries of origin, other forms of support provided by expatriates, and reduced pressures arising from labor supply. These benefits probably outweigh the disadvantages. However, each country differs from the others, and these assumptions should be verified on a country-by-country basis.

- For countries of origin such as Arab countries, migrant workers may have a negative effect on certain sectors and population groups in destination countries, namely European countries. Migrants are often willing to accept wages lower than those prevailing in destination-country labor markets, thereby replacing local workers in some fields. This may generate resentment and xenophobia toward them. The problem is aggravated in sectors that already have an adequate or surplus labor supply, and these effects may increase because of migration caused by climate change.

- According to the 2023-2024 Arab Barometer Migration Report, economic motives are the principal driver of migration in most countries: 90% of respondents in Jordan, 89% in Tunisia, 72% in Lebanon, and 57% in the State of Palestine.

Conclusion

Migration is fundamental to Euro-Mediterranean relations. European Union countries have organized migration policies, particularly in Mediterranean countries. However, these policies are often criticized for their unilateral nature and for not being based on a genuine partnership with Arab countries, which are a major source of migrants. They also tend to focus on European security and political interests more than on shared economic interests. On the other hand, positive theories of migration affirm that migration from Arab countries benefits the European economy in general by meeting the labor needs of the labor market, especially in light of the growing phenomenon of population ageing affecting European societies. In addition, migrants fill jobs that Europeans refuse to perform. Given the substantial decline in fertility rates in European Union countries, whose average is 1.58, far below the natural replacement rate of 2.1, migration is a principal means of compensating for population decline and alleviating demographic deficits in these countries.

Recommendations

- Adopt sustainable development policies aimed at strengthening human security in Arab societies in order to reduce youth migration. These policies should seek to benefit from the high proportion of young people within a population structure undergoing demographic transition, thereby supporting the development process and achieving its intended objectives. They should also integrate the concept of the 'demographic dividend,' resulting from the current historical and social stage characterized by a large youth population, into development objectives, strategies, policies, and plans.

- Arab intellectuals and researchers residing abroad should be encouraged to use the open media system to exert a positive influence on European public opinion. To achieve this, allocations for scientific research expenditure should be increased to no less than 1% of gross domestic product, as the minimum recommended globally. Integration should also be ensured between the effectiveness of domestic scientific research and its external role in promoting development processes.

- The League of Arab States should formulate basic rules aimed at establishing a migration system to be negotiated according to the logic of partnership with the European Union and Western migrant-receiving countries. This system should protect the interests of both the Arab and European parties, while strengthening national policies in Arab Member States and encouraging them to adopt these principles as a basis for bilateral negotiations.
- The European Union should implement the requirements of the global approach adopted by the United Nations in dealing with migration. Its migration policy should be based on an equal partnership, and unilateral policies should be avoided.
- The European Union should determine the volume of migration that is necessary and beneficial by taking into account the needs and consequences for both countries of origin and destination.

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